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1.  Introduction 
J avier Gut ierrez-Rexach 
Th e Ohio State  University 
In this paper,  I present a dynamic semantics of permission sentences which an­
alyzes the effects of deontic  operators in discourse. Permission statements are 
known to be problemat ic  for logical and linguist ic theories based on standard 
systeml' 0f modal logic .  These systems lead to predictions that are contrary 
to what natural language intuit ions di ctate. The tension between tradit ional 
modai cieontic  semantics and the proper characterization of the meaning of 
permissivn statements involving the deontic expression may has surfaced in 
the form of a number of so-called paradoxes or problems . The most relevant 
ones in the philosophical l iterature are ( i ) the paradox of free choice permiss­
sion (Von Wright , 1969 ;  Kamp ,  1973 ) and ( i i ) Lewis' ( 1 979) problem about 
spurious permission. My proposal gives a solution to these two problems and 
to the intrincacies of the meaning of boolean connect ives in  statements of this 
sort . 
2 .  Free Choice Sentences 
Consider the following sentences : 
( 1 ) a. You may eat a banana or a pear 
b. You may eat a banana 
(2 ) a. You may go to San Francisco or stay in L . A .  
b . You may g o  to San Francisco 
Sentences ( la) and (2a) are "free choice" permiSSIOn statements .  If a 
speaker utters ( la) , he is giving the addressee permission to eat either a ba­
nana or a p ear. In other words, the addressee is free to choose from the options 
presented by the speaker :  eat a banana, eat a pear or both . Therefore, when 
the speaker gives permission to the addressee to eat a banana or a pear ,  he 
is  giving him permission to eat a banana. Our intuitions are, then, that ( la) 
entails ( lb ) and (2a) entai ls (2b) . Nevertheless ,  this represents a problem 
for standard systems of deontic logic ,  as noticed by Ross ( 1 941 ) , Von Wright 
( 1969) and Kamp ( 1973 , 1 979) . In these systems , the entailment pattern that 
can be straigthforwardly derived is exactly the opposite, as the following proof 
shows : 
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( 3 )  I- Prj> -+ P(rj> V 1j; )  
P roof: P ( rj»  
P(rj»  V P ( 1j; )  
P (  rj> V 1j; )  
P (rj»  -+ P (rj> V 1j;)  
Assumpt ion 
V intro. 
Modal t heorem 
Kamp ( 1 973 ,  1 979) found the accounts presented to date not satisfactory 
and proposed a solution in the spirit of Lewis '  ( 1 979) proposal . The solution 
essent i ally consisted in spelling out the semantics of commands and permis­
sion statements introducing some concepts that in a certain respect anticipate 
the dynamic view of meaning. A command,  according to Kamp and Lewis , 
restricts the options for action of the addressee. A permission statement broad­
ens the options for action of the addressee. The options for action of an agent 
at t ime t and world ill are formally defined as the possible continuations of 
ill after t in which the agent fulfills all his obligations and forbears doing the 
things from which he is  prohibited. 
Let Per( ill , t , B)  deltote the set of possible continuations of ill after t in 
which the agent B fulfills his obligations and does not transgress anything he 
is prohibited from doing. Suppose that A utters in  w at t sentence (4) , and 
that B i s  the addressee of A ' s  utterance . 
(4 )  Clean my table! 
Let S be  the set of worlds in which B cleans A's table. Then , accord­
i ng to Kamp , the effect of A ' s  command is  to restrict the set of permitted 
cont inuations for B in ill at t to those in which B cleans A's table: 
(5) Per( ill , t , B)  1-----7 Per( ill , t , B) n 5 
A permission has the opposite effect in the set of options for action of a 
given agent . If a spe<l.l;::;r A tells B You may rj> and 5' is the set of worlds in 
which 4> holds, then the effect of A's  utterance is  to enlarge the set of permitted 
options for B with 5': 
(6) Per(ill , t , B )  1-----7 Per(w, t , B) U S' 
In order to handle the entailment relat ion between ( la) and ( l b) or (2a) 
and (2b ) , Kamp ( 1 973) introduces a new notion of entailment , P (ermission)­
entailment , defined as follows: 
(7 )  rj> P-entails 1j; iff in every situation the  set  of  worlds added to the options 
of the addressee through the use of rj> includes the set of worlds added 
to the set of options through the use of 1j; 
Kamp ( 1 979) abandons this solution because he considered it problematic 
with respect to the spurious permisssion problem (Lewis' problem) that we 
will d iscuss below. In a nutshell , the above definition of entailment predicts 
that when an agent is  granting the permission stated in (8a) he may also also 
be granting (8b ) . 
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(8 )  a .  You may go to San Francisco 
b .  You may go to San Francisco and b u r n  my house 
Sentence (8a) P-entails (8b) i n  al l  contexts  in which if the proposit ion 
expressed by ( 9a) is true in  a world w ,  then the propos i t ion expressed by ( 9b )  
is also true in w .  In  other words, the set o f  worlds in  which the  addressee burns 
the speaker's house is  a subset of the set of worlds in which the addressee goes 
to San Francisco.  
(9) a .  You burn my house 
b. You go to San Francisco 
The alternative solution proposed by Kamp ( 1 979) is that the meaning 
of You m a y  rP OT 1j; is  computed by separately calculating :Le option space 
granted by You may </> and the option space granted by YOll may 1j; first , and 
combining the two of t hem by set-theoretic union . Then , writing [rP]per w , t  
to denote the set  of worlds added to the options of  the addr:sse in  < w ,  t > 
through the utterance of </>, the following holds: 
( 1 0 )  [ You may rP or 1j; ]Per w,t = 
[ You may rP ]Per w ,t U [ You may 1j; Ver w,t  
This resolves the entailment problem but , as pointed out by Rohrbaugh 
( 1995 ) ,  it predicts the equivalence of ( l l a) and ( l lb) : 
( 1 1 )  a .  I permit you t o  eat an apple or a pear 
b .  I permit you to  eat an apple or I permit you to eat a pear 
The above sentences are not equivalent , nor are the following ones , i llus­
trating the fact that VP-Ievel disjunction does not have t�,..; same effect in 
permission sentences as sentence level (or speech-act level ) disjunction does . 
VP-level d isj unction under the scope of a permission operator amounts to a 
free choice permission statement , whereas the disjunction of two permission 
statements does not constitute a free choice statement but rather an exclusive 
permission statement :  only one of the disj uncts is permitted. 
( 1 2) a. You may go to San Francisco or stay in L .A .  
b .  You may go to  San Francisco or  you may stay in  L . A .  
3 .  Strong and Weak Readings 
Kamp ( 1 979) also noticed that the sentence in ( l a) ,  repeated here as ( 1 3a) , 
is ambiguous between two readings: a strong reading and a weak reading. 
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I n i ts "strong" or most salient reading it const itutes a free choice permiss ion 
s tatement and entails ( 1 3b ) .  In the "weak" reading, ( 1 3a) s imply states the 
speaker's ignorance about which d isj unct i s  actually permitted . In this read ing ,  
( 1 3b )  entai l s  ( 1 3a) . 
( 1 3 ) a. You may eat a banana or a pear 
b. You may eat a banana 
8. 1 .  Properties oj t h e  StTOng Reading 
The strong read ing of a permission sentence makes i t  a free choice permission 
statement :  the speaker i s  granting permission to the addresse ( 1 4a) or tell ing 
the acldressee that he i s  granting perm i ssion to a third person/s ( 1 4b ) :  
( 14 )  a .  You may g o  to San Francisco or stay i n  L .A .  
b .  John may go to  San Francisco or stay in L .A .  
T h e  strong reading of a permission statement may be paraphrased by a 
performat ive sentence : 
( 1 5 )  I hereby p e rmit  you to go  t o  San Francisco or stay in  L .A  
( 1 6 )  John may buy an Ope l  or  a Honda = 
I h e Te b y  p e rmit John to buy an Opel or a llonda 
A third characteriz ing p roperty of the s trong reading i s  that ,  as was d i s­
cussed in the previous section, the fol low i ng holds: P(<f; V 'lj;) F P (<f;) .  The 
opp osi te d i rect ion does not hold : P (t,b) � P (<f; V VJ ) ·  Also,  in the strong reading 
the  equi val ence in  ( 1 7 )  holds .  
( 1 7 ) P ( �  V 'lj; )  � P (<f;) A P ('lj; )  
The fol low ing example i l l us trates the above equi valence.  I f  the speaker i s  
g i v ing permiss ion to  J ohn to  buy an Opel or a Honda by  uttering ( 1 8a) , t hen 
the permiss ion granted by the speaker is the same as the permission granted 
when u t ter ing ( 1 8b ) . 
( 1 8 )  a .  John Illay buy  an  Opel or a Honda 
b .  John  may buy an Opel and J ohn m ay buy a Honda 
There i s  a vaT i ety of t h e  strong reati i ng i n w h i ch the  d i sj unction connect i ve 
i s  con s t r u e d  as e x c lus i ve o r. For instance,  i n  the following di scourse,  t h e  p aren t 
i s  most  l i kel y  gra .nt i ng perm i ss ion to b u y  a car or take a vacation but  not b oth . 
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( 1 9) As a gift for your graduation , you may buy th i s  expensive car 
or take the trip to the B ahamas that you wanted so much 
3. 2.  Properties of the Weak Reading 
A permission statement in its weak reading i s  a free choice permission re­
port :  it s imply states the speaker's ignorance about wh ich disjunct is actually 
p ermitted.  
(20 ) John may buy an Opel or a Hon d a  = 
John has been granted perm iss ion to buy an Opel or a Honda (but I 
don't know which one) 
In the weak reading of the above sentence , the speaker i s  reporting to the 
addressee that a third person has granted John permission to buy an Opel or 
a Honda. Consequently, permission statements in their weak reading may not 
be paraphrased by a performative sentence. 
In comparison to the strong reading, it can be observed that the reverse en­
tailment patterns arise: P(</> V 1/;) F P (¢) does not hold , but P (</»  F P (</>  V 1/; )  
holds . Another entai lment pattern of interest is  the following one, i l lustrated 
in (2 1 ) : P C</»� V P(1/;) F P(</> V 1/;) 
(2 1 ) a. John may buy an Opel or John may buy a Honda F 
b .  John may buy an Opel or a Hond a 
The weak reading of a permission sentence is a combination of a deontic 
and an epistemic statement . It cannot be considered a pure epistemic sentence. 
In other words , there is a subtle difference between the "permission report " 
reading and a pure ep i stem ic read i ng . For instance, sentence (21b ) i n  i t s  
epistemic reading means that i t  is possible that John buy a Opel or a Honda 
-perhaps because he has not decided yet about which one , or the speaker 
does not know the content of h i s decision , or John is hoping to get a loan 
to finance the car , etc. These are al l circumstances that make the epi stem ic 
reading true. The permission report reading requires someth ing different and 
much more specific, namely that the speaker i s  reporting the effect of a deontic  
p ermission statement .  
In some languages , the distinction between the strong and the weak read i ng 
i s  lexically realized -different adverbials  are used- or i s  encoded by different 
complement types .  In Spanish , a clause embedded under a modal verb has 
to be tenseless in the strong read ing , whereas the weak or permission report 
read i ng requires subj unctive mood in the embedded c lause .  
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(22 )  a .  Puede Pedro i r  al CIne 
may Pedro go to-the cinema 
' Pedro may go to the cinema '  ( s t rong read ing)  
b .  Pedro puede i r  al  cine 
Pedro may go to-the cinema 
(23 )  Puede que Pedro vaya al C lI1e 
may that Pedro go-subj to-the cinema 
' Pedro may go to the cinema' (weak read ing) 
4. A c t i o n s  i n  Dynam i c  S emant ics 
The essence of the dynamic concept ion of semantics i s  to  consider the b as i c  
meaning of a sentence to  be not i t s  truth-condi t ional content but  i ts  context­
change potent i al .  The meaning of an arbitrary expression ¢ in  a state s i s  the 
change that ¢ br ings about to s ,  or the up date value of ¢. Let us assume that 
a conversat ion is i n  a d i scourse state s .  Then , after process i ng a formula ¢ ,  
the  d i scourse moves to a state s ' ,  as  depi cted i n  (24 ) .  The state s'  i s  l i ke s 
except that those poss ib i l i t ies that are not compatible with what ¢ expresses 
( the  cond i t ion S )  are eliminated. Us ing a postfix notat ion , we write s[ ¢ ]  for 
the  meaning of the formula ¢ in a state s, as in (25 ) .  
( 24 )  -t s -t ¢ -t s' -t  
(25 )  s [ ¢ ] = s' iff s' <;;; s and S 
Information growth consists in the el iminat ion of poss ib i l it ies from an in i ­
t i al s tate  s .  vVhen a formula ¢ i s  i nterpreted i n  a state s ,  some of  the  poss ib i l i ­
t ies i n  s are el iminated -·those incompat ible with ¢�-, so the state 1> '  result ing 
from the update of s with ¢ i s  always a subset -not necessarily proper-··- of 
s .  
Different branches of dynamic sem a nt i cs vary with respect t o  what t hey 
consider to be an information state . In D P L  ( Groenend ij k and Stokhof, 1 99 1 )  
and D M G  ( G roenend ij k and Stokhof, 1 990)  a state i s  a set of ass ignments of 
values to vari ables . In D RT,  a state corresponds to a D i scourse Represen tat ion 
Structure K , such that K i s  the DRS bui l t  after process ing a d iscourse ( a  finit e  
sequence o f  sentences) .  In Dynamic 1\10dal Logic a state i s  a s e t  o f  worlds .  Th i s  
i s  the  concept ion o f  a state that we  w i l l be adopt ing here . Fu rthermore , states 
wil l be  epistem ical ly construed , ie . \\'c w i l l bc talk ing about the knowled ge 
s tate of an agcnt rather than of a d i scourse  state or il conversat ion state .  
This point i s  important i n  the type of account  t h at wi ll be developed , because 
the c1ynilTn i c  content of perm i ss ion s ( a t emell ts  w i l l be til  ken to be i ts update 
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potential with respect to the knowledge state of an agent ( the speaker ) , not 
wi th  respect to the deont ic  space of the addressee . 
Dynamic action semantics adds to standard dynamic semantics a more 
refined analysis of act ion expressions . This analys is ,  I claim ,  i s  needed in 
order to give a correct account of the semantics of permission sentences . I 
present an extension of current dynamic modal frameworks (Veltman, 1 996 j  
Groenendij k ,  Stokhof and Veltman ,  1995 j  Van Eij ck and Cepparello,  1 995)  
that incorporates a dynamic semantics for actions ,  along the lines proposed in  
Pratt 's ( 1 978)  process semanti cs ,  Van der Meyden 's  ( 1 996) logic of  permiss ion 
and Hambl in ' s  ( 1 987 )  analysis of imperatives . 
The language of Dynamic Action Logic ( D A L) has two sorts of expressions :  
proposit ional or state expressions and act ion express ions .  Propositions hold 
of states of affairs, whereas actions produce a change of state. 
An action express ion 0 i s  conceived of as denot i ng a program, ie. a set of 
sequences of states . Consider the following action expression : 1 
(26) K i ll (Caesar ) ( B rutus) 
Let us assume that the expression above denotes in a model M a three 
membered set of sequences of states. Each sequence represents an execution 
of the act ion ( Israel , Perry and Tut iya , 1993 ) ,  i . e .  the way of performing the 
act ion that results in that sequence of states .  
In  the process semantics given i n  (27 ) ,  each sequence represents a different 
execution of B rutus '  act ion of killing Caesar in M. For instance, in  one exe­
cut ion he stabs Caesar three times , in another he stabs Caesar thirty times , 
and in the third one he stabs him fifteen times . An execution of an action is a 
t ransit ion between states . The minimal requi rement that all the sequences in  
the  denotation of 0 have to satisfy is that i n  the  initial state of  the sequence 
Caesar i s  not dead, and i n the final one he i s .  
( 28 )  
• 
S 2 l  IF Dead(Ca esar) 
55 1 IF Dead( Ca esar) 
S 8 1  IF Dead( Caesar)  
---+ 0 ---+ • 
S30 F= Dead(Caesar)  
5 60 F= Dead( Caesar) 
S 9 0  F= Dead(Caesar) 
The sy ntax of the language of DAL i s  defined as follows: Let Act = { 
0, (3 " , . . . } be a set of atomic action constants and Prop = { tjJ, 1/; ,  . . . } a 
set of atomic  propos i t ions or state constants .  The set of action expressions is 
defined to be the smallest set A contain i ng Act such that if 0 ,  (3 E A , then 
o U (3 E A , O J  (3 E A and , 0  E A. The set of p ropos i t ional expressions of the 
language of D A L is  the smal lest set P contain i ng  P rop and sat isfy ing : 
1 .  If 9, l' E P ,  the ll , 0 .  tjJ /\ 1/) , tjJ V 1/; E P .  
DYNAMIC ACTION SEMANTICS AND DEONTIC OPERATORS 
2. If 0: E A ,  and 4> E P ,  then 0: -+ 4> E A .  
3 .  I f  0: E A , then 0 0: ,  0 0 ,  Ti O:  E P .  
A model for the language of D A L  i s  a t uple M = < W, S ,  P, T ,  V > . W 
i s  a set of worlds and W = P(A) , where A is a set. of finite ly many atomi c  
sentences . This gives us t h e  desi red epistemic  i nterpretation o f  worlds .  A 
world is a set of facts -atomic sentences- i n  the knowledge base of an agent 
(Veltman ,  1996 ) .  S � P(W)  is the set of s t ates , so a state i s  a set of possible 
worlds .  The knowledge state of an agent i s ,  then , a fam i ly of sets of facts ,  
i . e .  those that const i tute possible epistemic  alternatives . Information growth  
i s  represented a s  elimination o f  some o f  those possibi l i t ies .  
The rel ation P i s  a relation between s tates , P � S X S, w here < 8 i ,  8j > E  P 
iff the transit ion from state 8 i  to st ate 8j represents a permitted state t ran­
s i t i on .  Generalizing from binary to n-ary sequences of states , we say that 
a sequence of st ates a = < 8 • . . .  8n > is permitted,  wt itten Perm(a) , iff ev­
ery binary state transit ion in the sequence is in  P. For instance, assume that 
8" , [Get a pay rai8e (John)]M = { <  8" • . . •  830 > , < 8 " , , 85 • . • .  860 > }  and i n  8"7 
the proposit ion that John manipulates his  sales report is true. Assuming that 
we are deal ing with agents with s tandard ethical cri teria, the first execution 
of the action is  not cons idered to b e  permitted because i t  contains a s tate 
transition < 8,6 , 8 '7 > which is not perm i t t e d :  thus ,  < 8 26 , 827 > f/. P and,  
as a consequence, ..,Perm( < 82 • • • •  830 » .  Thi s corresponds to the intuit ion 
that an execution of the action of gett ing a pay raise involving a manipula­
tion of a sales report is not permitted,  even i f  the rest of the transi tions that 
bring about the completion of the action are permitted. Only the execution 
< 8, . , 8 5 • . . .  860 > may be permitte<;l , if  al l  the transit ions between states i n  the 
sequence are i n  the relation P of M .  
The function r : A -+ P(S+ ) i s  the interpretation function for atomic  
action expressions 0: E A ,  i . e . r ( Q ) i s  the  s e t  of  sequences of  states denoted 
by Q .  F i n al ly, the function V maps atomic proposit ional constants 4> to the 
set of worlds where the proposition holds . 
The notions of support or acceptance of a proposi t ional express ion or for­
mula in a state and the derived notions of dynamic entailment and equivalence 
between formulas are as follows : a state 8 supports or accepts a formula 4> iff 
updating 8 with 4> returns 8; a formu l a 1/J is entai led by 4> • . . .  4>n iff the update 
of 8 w i t h  4> • . . . 4>n supports 'lj; ;  finally, two formulas are equivalent iff they entai l 
each other. 
(29 )  Support /Acceptance: s I I- 4> iff 8 [4>] = s 
D ynami c entai lment : 4> • . . . 4>n � 1/J iff V8 . ( (8 [¢. ] )  . . . [4>n] )  I I- 'lj; 
Equivalence: 4> == 'lj; iff ¢ � 1/J & 1/) � ¢ 
The expressions  of the l angu age of DA L are i nt erpreted in a st ate 8 as 
fol lows : 
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S e n� ant i c s :  
1 . S [4>] = { lO E s i lO E V(4))} 
2 . s [.4>] = { lO E s ilO  ct. V(4)) } 
3 .  s [4> /\ 1jJ] = ( s [4>] ) [1/>] 
4 .  s [4> V  1/>] = { lO E s ilO E V (4)) or w E (s [.¢] ) [7/)] } 
5 .  s [a] = {a la  E T (a) & firs t (a )  = s}  
(where if  0' = < S " ' . S n  > ,  first (a )  = s , and las t (a ) = sn ) 
6 .  s [.a] = {a la  ct. T(a) & first (a )  = s}  
7 .  s [a u !3ll = s [a] U s [!3ll 
8 . s [a ; !3ll = {a , r'-- 0'2 10' ,  E T (a) & 0'2 E T (f3 )  & firs t (a , ) = s & first (a2 ) = 
las t ( a , ) }  
9 .  s [a -+ 4>] = s i ff  V a  E s [a] [las t (a )  I I- 4>J 
1 0 . Weak permiss ion : 
s [Oa] = s iff 30' E s [a] such that Perm(a)  
1 1 .  s [Da] = 5 [  .O.a] 
1 2 .  Strong permi ssion : 
s [rra] = s iff Va E 5 [a] . Perm(a)  
Let  us explain the clauses of  the defini t i o n i n  more detai l .  The dynamic 
semantic  value of a proposit ional expression 4> i n  a s tate s i s  the set of those 
worlds in  s in which 4> holds . Similarly, i f  5 i s updated with .4>, the resul t ing 
state s' i s  the subset of  s constituted by the world s i n  which 4> does not  hold .  
Another way o f  expressing this is the fol lowing :  
s [4>] = 5 - { lO E s ilO rf. V(<fJ) } 
5 [.4>] = s - { lO E s i lO E V(4)) } .  
The dynam i c content o f  the express ion 4> /\ 1b i s  computed b y  updating first 
the state s w i th 4> and , as a resul t ,  el iminat ing from s the worlds that are not 
i n V(4)) . Then , the resul t i ng state is updated with V' , y i el d i ng a final state in 
which the worl d s  that are not in \/(4)) and t h e  worl ds t. h at are not in V (1/» are 
eliminated. The interpret at ion of dynamic d i sj unct ion  has an exclusive flavor 
built in . Updat ing s with 4> V 1/> restr icts s to the set of worl ds  that are e i ther 
i n  V(4)) or are not i n  V(<;'» but are i n  V (V' ) ,  
Action expres s i ons d o  not have the same sem ,mt i c type as proposit ional 
express ions .  The update value of an act ion express ion a i n  a s tat e  5 is not 
a state but a set of sequences of s t ates .  The dyn am i c  content of an action 
express ion a in a state s i s  the set of sequences of s tates a in the denotatioIl 
of a , T ( a ) ,  such that the first coord i na t e  of a is s .  Obviously, this represents  
the "atemporal" value of act ions ,  which i s  ess e nt i a l ly forward-looking and suf­
fices for our  purposes . The effect of the past a.nd fu ture operators would be 
captured as fol lows -where -< t i s  a n  order i n g  re l at ion between s t ates :  2 
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s [P(a)D  = {cr I cr E T ( a ) & 3s' [s' -< t s & las t (cr )  = S'] } 
s [ F ( a ) ] = {cr I cr E T ( a ) & 3s' [s -< t S ' & firs t (cr )  = ,� ' ] } 
The clauses defini ng operations on actions are straightforward .  U pdating s 
with  oa yields the set of sequences of states that are not in the denotation of a 
and such that their in i t ial state is s .  The dynamic  conj unction of two actions 
a and f3 is the pairwise concatenation of the sequences of states i n  T ( a ) and 
T(f3) sati sfying the cond i t ion that the last state in  a sequence cr i n  T ( a ) and 
the first state in  a sequence cr' in  T (f3 ) are equal . The formula a ---+ ¢ may be 
read as  " if a then ¢" or ,  perhaps more properly, "after a ,  ¢" . The propos i t ion 
a ---+ ¢ i s  supported i n  a state s iff all the executions in the denotation of a 
with i n i t ial state s are such that i ts  last state supports ¢. 
The effect of the modal operators <) and 7r corresponds to  existenti al and 
universal quantification over sequences of states in the dynamic  content of an 
action respectively. Thus, for any action a and state s ,  Oa i s  supported by s 
iff there i s  a permitted sequence in the denotat ion of a with in i t ial s tate s or ,  i n  
other words,  if  some execution of a with in it ial state s i s  permitted .  Conversely, 
s supports 7ra iff al l executions of a with in i t ial state s are permit ted . 
4 .  Explaining t he strong /weak contrast 
The strong and weak readings of permission sentences are represented by the 
presence of the strong (7r) or weak (0) permission operator respectively. The 
strong operator models free choice, whereas the weak operator models par­
t i al ignorance about permission. The update of a state s with 7ra adds the 
informat ion that al l  the executions of a are permitted i n  s .  In  other words , 
all possible executions of the action a are considered as permit ted by the 
agent whose knowledge state has been updated with 7r a .  Consider one of the 
examples presented previously: 
(30 )  You may take a banana or  an apple  
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By uttering  sentence (30 ) , the speaker i s  express ing a fact that holds in h i s  
knowledge base in  a state s or he is  updating i t  with a fact that i s  supported 
by s . The strong reading of (30) states that any course of act ion  in which 
the addressee takes a banana or an apple and such that it does not v iolate 
what the speaker cons iders permissible i s  permitted : al l the execut ions  cr of 
the act ion of taking a banana or the action of taking an apple  performed by 
the  addressee are such that Perm( cr ) . This is preci sely represented as follows :  
( 3 1 ) s [,, (Take (a  banana ) ( you )  U Take(an apple ) (you ) ) ] = s iff 
Vcr E s [Take (a banana) (you) u 
Takc(an appl e ) (you ) ] . Pel'm (cr )  i ff  
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'11(/ E 8 [Take(a  ba nana) (you ) ]  U 
8 [Take (an appl c ) ( you) ] . Perm«(/)  
A knowledge state 8 supports 7r (Take(a banana ) ( you ) UTake(an appl e ) (you ) )  
i f  and only i f  all the sequences (/ i n  the denotation of Take(  a banana)  (you )  
with in i t ial state 8 and al l  the sequences (/' i n  the denotation of Take(  an  apple )  
(you )  with  in i t ial state 8 are such that Perm«(/)  and Perm«(/') holds .  As i s  
apparent , th is  says noth ing about the knowledge state o f  t h e  addressee , s o  here 
we depart from Kamp's  conception of the meaning of a free permission state­
ment l ike (30 )  as enlarging the" option space of the addressee. The primary 
content of ( 30 )  is not to affect the epistemic or deont ic state of the addresse , 
but  rather to update the knowledge state of an agent --the speaker- with 
the assertion that the  actions expressed i n  (30 )  are permitted according to the 
speaker . A different perspective would be to consider the effect of  th is  permis­
sion statement on the agent it is  addressed to. This would require ancillary 
notions such as satisfaction of or compliance with (30) , that would demand a 
multi-agent semantics relating states in the knowledge bases of two (or more) 
d ifferent agents ,  in this case the speaker and the addressee. Interest ingly, a 
multi-agent semant ics i s  not needed to account for the data under considera­
t ion i n  th i s  paper. 
The following facts are immediately derived applying the definit ions : 
Fact 1 :  7r (  a U  f3) f= 7r ( 0: ) 
Fact 2 :  7r (a  U f3) == 7r ( 0: ) 1\ 7r ({3 ) 
Fact 1 captures in a straithforward way the entailment pattern of strong 
read ings,  whereas fact 2 derives the equivalence pointed out in  ( 1 5 ) .  The read­
ing of ( 1 9 ) and (32 )  w i th  exclusive or requires an additional b inary operat ion 
on act ions ( u ) :  
( 3 2 )  You may buy a Porsche o r  a Corvette 
The operation U i s  defined as fol lows :  
8 [0: u f3] = 8 [0:] U 8 ['0: ; ,B] 
The act ion 0: U (3 denotes in a state 8 the un ion of the set of sequences i n  
T ( 0:) with first state 8 and set of sequences i n  . a ;  f3 . Obviously, a; {3 i s  not 
i n  the set of executions of 0: U {3 in 8 .  The equivalence between the exclus ive 
reading of (32 )  and sentence (33)  
( 33 )  You may buy a Porsche o r  you may b u y  a Corvet te 
i s  predicted by the fol lowing fact :  
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Fact 3: n ( o U (3) == n ( a ) V n ((3)  
L e t  us now consider the weak read i ng of permission sentences . A knowledge 
s tate s supports 00 iff there i s  at leas t  an execution of a that is  considered to 
be permitted in s. When a speaker ut ters ( 34 ) ,  he i s  asserting that there i s  a 
course of action in which the addressee takes a banana or an apple and such 
that i t  docs not violate what is  permissible within the speaker's know l ege , as 
shown in (35) . 
( 34 )  You may take a banana or an apple 
( 35) s [O(Take(a  banana ) (yoll ) U Take(an apple ) (yoll ) ) ]  = s iff 
:3 0"  E s [Take(a  banana ) ( you ) U 
Take(an appl e ) ( yoll ) ]  such that Perm(O" ) ,  iff 
:30" E s [Take (a  banana ) (you) ]  U 
s [Take(an apple ) (you)] such that Pe rm (O") 
The strong reading of a permi ssion sentence i s  represented as universal 
quant ificat ion over sequences or executions because it  does not seem plausible 
that if an agent is  giving permission to do someth ing and there i s  an execution 0" 
such that all the state transi t ions in  0" are i n  the permission relation P -the set 
of permitted binary transit ions-, i t  might still be the case that the execution 
0" i s  not permitted . Our i ntuit ions are that i n  the latter case the relevant agent 
is not giving a ful l  or unrestricted permission or ,  in other words,  blocking 0" as 
not permitted is  inconsistent with all the state transit ions involved being i n  
P and all other execut ions o f  the act ion being permitted . This explains why 
universal quant ificat ion over sequences captures strong permiss ion.  
On the other hand , the permission report reading j ust represents the i dea 
that the speaker i s  aware that some execut ion of an act ion i s  permitted -
because he has been to ld so .  The i nformation that is avai lable to h im is that the 
execut ion under cons i derat ion i s  p erm i t ted . Thus , the operator representing 
the weak read i ng of the mo d al verb i n troduces ex i stential quantification over 
sequences of states (execut ions ) and not universal quantificat ion . 
This character izat ion of the weak reading allows for an interesting dist inc­
t i o n :  it may be the case that the speaker i s  report ing an act ion as permitted 
accord ing to cr iter ia that are not h is  own .  In other words ,  i t  i s  possible that 
the speaker reports a p ermiss ion that contradicts what h is  own criteria of per­
miss ibi l i ty are . The preferred read i ng  of ( 36 )  i s  the one in which the speaker 
agrees or at least is not in open disagreement with the permiss ion he is report­
ing .  Sent.ence ( 3 7 )  is more neutral in that respect . 
(:36 ) You m ay rea d t h at b ook . 
( 37 ) YOll a r e  a l l owed to read that  book .  
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In Spanish , sentence (38 ) ,  the correlate of (36 ) ,  would be infel i ci tous if 
u ttered by an agent who does not agree with  the permission he i s  report ing .  
In  t h i s  case only sentence (39) , the correlate of (37 )  above , would  b e  fel i c i tous . 
(38)  P uedes leer ese l ibro 
may-you read that book 
(39)  Se te permite leer ese li bro 
IMPERS . you allows read that book 
The proper treatment of this distinction would require models in  which 
instead of a unique permiss ib i l i ty relation P ,  there is a family of such relations 
Pi � S x S ,  where i is  an agent index . Then , the weak reading of (38) wou ld 
be supported in a knowledge state s of an agent i ut tering the sentence iff t here 
i s  an execution of the action of reading a book such that all state trans i t ions 
i n  that execution are in  Pi , for j an agent different from i ,  and are also in 
Pi.  The weak reading of sentence (39 ) would be supported in a knowledge 
state s of an agent i iff there i s  an execution of the action of reading a certain 
book such that all  state transitions i n  that execution are in Pj , for j an agent  
different from i ,  and are n o t  in Pi . 
Facts 4 and 5 are agai n immediately deri ved by applying the definit ions ,  
and predict the propert ies described in section 3 .2  above . 
Fact 4: 0(0) V 0({3) 1= 0(0 U (3) 
Fact 5 :  0(0) 1= 0(0) V 0({3) 
From fact 4 ,  the entailment pattern i n  example ( 2 1 ) ,  repeated here as ( 40 ) , 
follows . 
(40) a. John may buy an Opel or John may buy a Honda 
b .  John may buy an Opel or a Honda 
When a speaker reports that John has been allowed to buy an Opel or 
J ohn has been allowed to buy a Honda, as i n  (40a) , the d i sjunctive connect i ve 
is i nterpreted as exClusive: the speaker reports that John has been granted 
permission to buy e i ther an Opel or a Honda, but not both .  The sentence 
has only one weak reading, the exclusive one. The report reading i n  wh ich 
or is i nterpreted as inclus ive is not possible ,  so the translation of (40a) to the 
language of DAL captures its exact mean ing .  
( 4 1 )  O(Buy(an Opel ) ( John ) )  V 0 ( B1ly (a  Honda ) ( Joh n ) )  
Formula ( 4 1 )  entai l s  ( 42 ) : i f  a st ate s s upports (4 1 )  i t also supports ( 42 ) . 
(42 )  O ( Buy(an Opel ) ( John)  U Buy(a Honda ) ( John ) )  
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The reverse direct ion does not hold .  Why is this  so? Because (42)  i s  
supported or accepted i n a stale s i l l  w h i ch John has been given perm i ss i on to  
b uy an Opel ,  a Honda or both .  Formula  ( 4 1 )  would not  be accepted i II s .  Thi�  
p roperty of (42)  mirrors the ambigu i ty of sentence (40b)  which ,  i n  contrast  to 
( 40a) , has two weak readi ngs: one i n  which 0 7' is construed as exclusive and a 
second one in which o r  i s  construed as inclusive. 3 
Lewis' ( 1 979)  problem about per m iss ion does not arise in  dynamic  act ion 
semantics ,  because permission sentences do not merely enlarge the option set 
of the addressee. On ly sequenccs of states consist ing of permitted trans i t ions 
are i n the denotation of the perm i ss ion operators . Therefore, from (43a) in 
its strong reading one cannot i n fcr ( ·nb )  because presumably most of the 
execut ions of the action bum my ho use arc not permitted even i f  tile two 
conjuncts are true in the same worlds .  
( 43 )  a.  You may go  to San Francisco 
h .  You may go to San Francisco and burn my house 
If (43a) i s  understood in its weak read ing and the speaker i s  report ing that 
somebody has allowed the addressee to go to San Francisco, the inference is 
val id  in DAL .  This case i s  not an ins t ance of spurious permisssion because, 
as was discussed above, permission reports do not i mply agreement with the 
permissibi l ity of what has been granted . 
5 .  Extensions of t h e  analysis 
5. 1 .  D ecreasingn ess 
Rohrbaugh ( 1 995) observes that perm i s sion sentences are decreasing 1 11 t he 
in ternal argument of the verb : (44a) enta i l s  (44b ) .  
(44 )  a. You may eat  th ree app les 
b. You may eat two applcs 
The decreasingness effect i s  pred icted as a result of the  presence of the per­
mission operator and the execut ion-based sequence semant i cs for act i o n s .  Vic 
say that an action {3 i s  an extension of or enco mpass es an act ion a (a :S (3) 
iff T(a)  = {CT; l 3CTj E T ({3 ) such that (J j  is a subsequence of (JJ . Then , from 
the defini tion of the extension relation between actions and the sem an t ics of 
the strong permission operator the fo l low i ng fact i s  derived : 
Fact 6 :  a :S {3 t\ 7i (3 F= ;o a  
This  fact captures t he intcn ded i nfercnce in ( 4 ·1 ) ,  but  would erro n eou s l y  
pred i c t  that in ( 45 ) be low t h e  i ns t r u c t o r. w h e n  al low i ng t h e  s t u dent  to w r i t e  
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two essay s  i nstead of tak i ng the midterm,  is also granting perm ission to write  
o n e  essay i nstead of tak i ng the m i dterm . 
( 4 5 )  I nstead of  tak i ng t h e  midterm you m ay wri te two essays 
In the most prom inent reading of (45) the decreas ingness effect is  blocked . 
Th is read ing can be cal led a "package deal" reading: the addressee is granted 
p ermiss ion to perform an act ion i n  wh ich he writes two essays instead of taking 
the midterm . This effect blocks the decras ingness property and may be taken 
as pragmat ically con d i t ioned . 4 
5 . 2. Permission in conditionals 
Consi der sentence (46a) : 
( 46 )  a .  I f  you commit a traffic violation, then you may appeal i t  in  court . 
b .  You may commit a traffic violat ion and appeal it in court . 
When a perm i ssion operator occurs i n  the consequent of a conditional, l ike 
i n  (46a) , the operator may not be exported out of the consequent . In other 
words, ( 46b)  i s  not entailed by (46a) . Some analyses of deontic sentences 
( Meyer ,  1 988)  val idate the inference from ( 46a) to (46b) .  This is so because 
the existence of a set of permitted states of affai rs is assumed and actions are 
t aken to be permi tted when they result in  a permitted state. The advantage 
of a process semantics for act ions , such as the one proposed for DAL, i n  which 
state trans i t ions rather than states are considered to be permitted or not 
permi t ted , i s  that a -+ 7f(3 does not entai l 7f (oo ; /3 ) .  Take M to  be a model 
w i th states s , ' S" S 3 and let the interpretat ion of the actions be given by 1' (00) 
= { <  s " s ,  > } and 1'((3)  = { <  S " S 3 > } .  In M ,  < s " s ,  > f/.  P and < 
S 2 , S 3  > E P ,  so the first t ransit ion i s  not a perm i tted state transition but the 
secon d i s .  Then , s, I f- a -+ rr/3 (8 ,  s u p ports or accept s  the formula a -+ rr(3) 
because last ( s , [oo] ) = 5 ,  If- rr/3.  The lat ter holds s ince < 5 , , 53 >E P,  so 
Perm«  S " S 3  » .  O n  the other han d ,  7; (00 ; /3 )  i s  not accepted/supported in 
5 ,  because the sequen ce < S l l  5, > .-.. < 5" 8 3 > = < 8 "  8" 83 > i s  not a 
perm i t ted sequence ( t h e  state trans it ion < 8 "  8, > i s  not in P) .  
5. 3. The repercllss ion of actions 
\V hen an i mperat i ve expression and a p ropos i t ion are connected by t h e  con­
nect i ves and/or, the second conj unct i s  i nterpreted as a repercussion of the 
comp l i an ce ( 4 7 a) or as a repercu ss ion of the  fai lure to comply (47b)  w i th  the  
command i n  t h e  fi rst  conj u nct ..  
( 4 7 )  a .  G o  to S a il Fran c isco anel .J a n c  wil l  b e  happy 
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b .  G o  to S an Francisco or J ane w i l l  be u n h appy. 
The trans lat ions of the sentences in ( 4 7 ) i ll to t h e l angu age of D A L are as 
fol l ow s :  
( 48 )  a. O Co t o  San F rancisco A J J  uppy ( J (lite )  
b . O Co to San Francisco V Unhappy ( Jane )  
The above formulas have as  thei r un ique i nterpretat ion a "repercussive" 
one. In other words, accord i ng to t he update semant i cs of A, the propos i t ion 
Jan e  will be  happy is  interpreted i n  the slate resu l t i ng from updating s with 
the command Co to San Francisco. S im i lar ly, t h e  semant i c clause for V y i elds 
ei ther the set of worlds in which the cornrnand i s  sat i s fied or the set of worlds 
resu l t ing from interpret ing the propos i t ion Ju n e  will be unhapp y in a state i n  
which the  addressee i s  al lowed t o  not going to San Fra.ncisco. 
(49 )  s [O Co to San Fmncisco V Unhappy (Jane ) ]  = 
{w E s I w E  s [OCo to San Fr-ancisco] or 
w E  ( s [  .... O Co to San FTancisco] ) [Un h appy ( Jane) ] } = 
{w E s I w E s [  .... O .... Co to San Francisco] or 
w E  ( s [  ........ O .... Co to San Fr-ancisco] ) [Unhappy ( Jane) ] } = 
s iff .... 3iT E s [ .... Co to San Fr-ancisco] such that Perm(iT)  or 
( s  [0 .... Co to  San Fr-ancisco] ) [ Unhappy ( J nne ) ]  
Endnotes 
( * ) I would l ike to t h an k  the audiences at S A r;r 7 ( S tanford , March 1 997) and 
at the 2 1 s t  Penn Linguistic Colloqu ium (Upenn,  February 1 997 ) ,  espec i al ly 
N i cholas Asher,  H ans Kamp,  Stan ley Peters and Roumyana Izvorski for thei r 
comments . 
1 .  A perh aps more intu i t i ve alternati ve would be to consider kil l(Caesar-) as 
an action expression and relativize i t  to age n t s .  Here we st i ck to t he s imp ler 
op t ion . 
2 .  Let T be a temporal trace funct i on m apping a state 5 to all interval , T ( s ) = i ,  
where i i s  the m oment o r  interval o f  t ime o ccu p ied by s ,  and let < b e  an 
order ing relat ion between intervals .  For any s t ates 5 ,  s' i n  a sequence iT and 
such that T (S ) = i and T ( 5 ' ) = j, 5 -< t S '  iff i < j .  
3 .  This i s  why t ranslat ing (4Gb) a s  ( i )  would be less adequate. The D A L  
formula i n  ( i )  on ly captures the excl us ive weak read ing o f  ( 'lOb) . 
( i ) O( Blly ( a n  Opcl ) ( John)  U Blly ( a  [{unria ) ( J ohn ) )  
4 . S t an ley Peters po i nts out that i t  may h e  d es i rab le t o  con s i der deont i c  
operators as  non-mono t on i c  i n  general and  take i n ferences related to act ion 
extens i on and decreas i ngness as the except i on . 
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